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Abstract
Network security protocols such as IPsec have been used for many years to ensure robust end⁃to⁃end communication and are impor⁃tant in the context of SDN. Despite the widespread installation of IPsec to date, per⁃packet protection offered by the protocol isnot very compatible with OpenFlow and flow⁃like behavior. OpenFlow architecture cannot aggregate IPsec⁃ESP flows in transportmode or tunnel mode because layer⁃3 information is encrypted and therefore unreadable. In this paper, we propose using the Secu⁃rity Parameter Index (SPI) of IPsec within the OpenFlow architecture to identify and direct IPsec flows. This enables IPsec to con⁃form to the packet⁃based behavior of OpenFlow architecture. In addition, by distinguishing between IPsec flows, the architectureis particularly suited to secure group communication.
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A1Introductions an attempt to embrace the future Internet and itstendency towards software⁃defined networks (SDN),OpenFlow suggests a move into programmable rath⁃er than configurable network deployments. This re⁃sults in faster innovations through software change rather thaninfrastructure adaption [1]. OpenFlow works well on the prem⁃ise that the control plane can be separated from data plane onnetwork packet forwarders and brought into an OpenFlow con⁃troller (a server) with centralized network management. All net⁃work elements, including routers and switches, are now simplepacket forwarders with no complexity. Starting initially withcampus networks, data centers such as Google are now exten⁃sively reinforced with this evolving architecture [2].On the other hand, end⁃to⁃end security of communication atthe IP level is guaranteed by the IPsec framework [3]. As theword“framework”implies, IPsec is not directly limited to anyspecific security algorithm or technology. Subsequently, thelevel of security can be tuned by different open standards andcombinations to fulfill various immunity requirements of theproduction environment. Virtual private network (VPN) as a so⁃lution for providing a logical channel between two peers over apublic and probably insecure network relies on the IPsec forits immunity. Small􀆼office home office (SOHO) scenario or dif⁃ferent sites of a corporation which are geographically spreadout are other possible use cases to apply VPN remedy over IP⁃
sec.Point ⁃ to ⁃ point tunnels between two VPN gateways used tobe exploited to carry authenticated as well as encrypted trafficfrom one site to another. However, group domain of interpreta⁃tion (GDOI) [4]-[6] with IPsec at its core goes even further sothat secure communication between various sites called groupmembers (GM) is now possible without any tunnels betweenthese branches.IPsec as an algorithm⁃independent framework addresses theconfidentiality by encryption as well as the integrity with theaid of hashing as the main security objectives while allows forauthenticating the origin of the traffic. Regardless of the corenetwork and its elements, the tunable IPsec protocol with hugeinstall base is simply provisioning the necessary security ser⁃vices for both end entities. Nonetheless, security gainedthrough IPsec is per⁃packet. This is not deployable to leadingfuture Internet designs such as OpenFlow architecture withflow ⁃ based behavior. OpenFlow aims to aggregate differentpackets into flows and process these flows rather than individu⁃al packets. OpenFlow, however, cannot uniquely identify IPsecflows and aggregate/direct these flows accordingly. We providethe ability to distinguish between IPsec flows in order to inte⁃grate secure group communication into the OpenFlow architec⁃ture. Our ultimate goal is to address this deficiency withinOpenFlow by our proposed method. We propose using a securi⁃ty parameter index (SPI) of IPsec within the OpenFlow archi⁃tecture to uniquely identify and direct IPsec flows.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2,we discuss briefly four basic elements used later for our pro⁃posed method. This is needed specifically to clarify ambigui⁃ties especially those pertaining to a complex protocol like IP⁃sec. The clarification emphasizes characteristics which formthe cornerstone of the method in section 3. Subsection 2.1 ex⁃plores OpenFlow and abstracts the ideas behind this evolvingarchitecture. Subsection 2.2 sanitizes the required features ofIPsec itself. The establishment of the secure channel throughinternet key exchange (IKE) is discussed in 2.3. Subsection2.4 briefly covers GDOI basics as a cryptographic protocol forgroup key management for secure group communications. Theproposed method is discussed in detail in section 3. Section 4elaborates on the main use case for the proposed method herewhich is secure group communication conforming to GDOIstandard and its integration into the OpenFlow. Section 5 con⁃cludes this paper.
2 Background
2.1 OpenFlow ArchitectureOpenFlow improves network programmability and enablespackets to be forwarded at a speed approximating the line⁃rate.This speed is possible due to minimized complexity stemmingfrom the separation of the control plane from data plane [1]. Toreduce system complexity, OpenFlow considers all network ele⁃ments, including routers and switches, as simple, hardware ⁃based packet forwarders. Complexity is thus shifted to the ap⁃plication layer, where software on the OpenFlow controller (aserver with sufficient resources) makes various decisions andinforms forwarders of the outcomes of these decisions. Theseoutcomes are disseminated as flow⁃tables across the packet for⁃warders and define various pairs (match, action). This meansthat for each incoming packet, if there is a match in the flow⁃ta⁃ble of the local device, a special action is performed. Threestandard actions are Forward, Encapsulate, and Drop. Forwardmakes the OpenFlow⁃enabled device act as a router/switch atthe line⁃rate. If no match is found or if the packet is the first ina new, undefined flow, it is encapsulated and forwarded to theOpenFlow controller, where decisions subsequently are made.The packet can also be discarded through a drop action.The network operating system (NOX) is a programmable in⁃terface that facilitates network management by providing an en⁃vironment for running applications sitting on the OpenFlowcontroller. The OpenFlow controller communicates with thepacket forwarders through the OpenFlow protocol over a se⁃cure SSL/TCP channel. With the aid of this open OpenFlowprotocol, different routers’and switches’flow ⁃ tables can beprogrammed in a scalable manner. Entries in each flow⁃ tableon every OpenFlow packet forwarder are associated with differ⁃ent actions while statistics are being collected. Fig. 1 (a) de⁃picts the separation of the control plane from data plane in
OpenFlow architecture in addition to the flow⁃ table structure.For instance, if the destination IP address of the incomingpacket is equal to 1.1.1.1, the packet is forwarded to a givenport. If it has 848 (UDP port for GDOI protocol) as the valuefor the source port, it will be encapsulated and then forwardedto the controller for further investigation. If the packet is IPsecencapsulating security payload (ESP) packet with type equal to50, it will be dropped.The first generation of OpenFlow packet forwarders, called
“OpenFlow spec v1.0 conforming switches”, defines flow head⁃er fields which encompass some features of each incomingpacket as illustrated in Fig. 1 (b). When a packet arrives, itsheader is firstly checked against the Match field and if theheader matches any row in the flow ⁃ table, the correspondingaction is performed. Any combinations amongst these demon⁃strated 10⁃ tuple can be utilized to define and aggregate flowsaccordingly. These flow header fields are then exploited in or⁃der to specify matches in flow⁃tables for each incoming packetand perform the corresponding action. However, OpenFlow iscurrently unable to distinguish between IPsec flows. The au⁃thors in [1] emphasize the header fields of“OpenFlow specv1.0 conforming switch”as the initial and standard headerfields with which every OpenFlow switch must comply. This issubstantial since later on we introduce our new flow header
MAC: message authentication codeNOX: network operating system TCP: transfer controln protocolVLAN: virtual local area network
▲Figure 1. (a) reveals the internal structure of OpenFlow architecture.
In (b), flow header fields defined for“OpenFlow spec v1.0 conforming
switches”(first generation OpenFlow packet forwarders) are shown.
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fields for the OpenFlow interface which is IPsec⁃aware and al⁃so backward compatible to“OpenFlow spec v1.0 conformingswitch”header fields.
2.2 IPsecWorking at the network layer, IPsec protects the traffic be⁃tween peers by provisioning encryption as well as authentica⁃tion from Layer 3 to Layer 7. On the other hand, all the currentlayer⁃2 technologies enable the IPsec framework function overthem. The IPsec framework comprises five components. Avail⁃able algorithm choices facilitated for each of these componentsresult in different security solutions with each combination tosatisfy various needs.The first component highlights the IPsec protocol and cansupport either authentication header (AH) or ESP (protocoltype 50 for ESP and 51 for AH).Each IPsec protocol operates either in transport or tunnelmodes. The encapsulations of the IP packet secured by IPsecwith AH/ESP in both transport and tunnel operation modes aredepicted in Fig. 2. Both protocols share provisioning authenti⁃cation and integrity security services. Nevertheless, confidenti⁃ality is not considered in AH. This is crucial to differentiatesegments of information which are encrypted and thus unread⁃able from other readable segments which can be meaningfulfor the third party in the middle of the conversation (i.e., open⁃flow switch or controller). The second component demonstratesthe choice for the encryption/decryption algorithm which per⁃tains to the confidentiality service. As with every cryptographicsystem, the longer the key, the harder it is for an attacker tobreak into the IPsec communication. The third component en⁃sures that the IPsec communication is not tampered with intransit and thus provides integrity. The fourth component facili⁃tates authentication of the endpoints in secure communicationvia IPsec. The last building⁃block specifies the Diffie⁃Hellman(DH) algorithm group according to different needs. DH is apublic key exchange mechanism that enables both communi⁃cating parties to come up with the same key over an unsecured
channel. The driven shared key is used by peers for symmetricencryption as well as hashing through message authenticationcode (MAC) in the second and third components of IPsec, re⁃spectively.In IPsec with AH, a message digest is formed by applyingthe hashing function to the original IP header and data payloadutilizing the shared key. The digest then constructs a new AHheader, which is injected into the original packet. The samecalculation is performed in the receiving party to find the exactmatch of hashes. Nonetheless, all the data is transmitted inplaintext. Not considering any encryption mechanism leads tohaving all the layer ⁃ 3 information in plaintext and thereforeroutable. However, the original IP header is also encrypted andunreadable when ESP is in tunnel mode. As we see later, thisinformation in plaintext is immensely valuable for our methodto differentiate various IPsec flows. Despite AH, in IPsec withESP, encryption makes payload and the ultimate transmitters’identifications meaningless to eavesdroppers. Both the IPheader and data payload are encrypted in this mode. This is fol⁃lowed by appending a new ESP header (as well as ESP trailer)and ESP authentication fields, including relevant encryptionand authentication data to the original packet.In Fig. 2, IPsec in transport mode merely considers the en⁃capsulation of the data payload and transfer control protocol(TCP)/user datagram protocol (UDP) data (layer⁃4 and above).Nonetheless, tunnel mode suggests that the whole IP datagramis encapsulated within a new IP packet. On the other hand,while secure communication between gateways demands tun⁃nel mode of the IPsec solution, transport mode facilitates host⁃to ⁃ host immune transmissions. While in AH, the original IPheader remains unencrypted, and thus leaves the routing in⁃tact, the original TCP/UDP header is encrypted in ESP. Bothprotocols in different modes have their SPI in plaintext withinthe ESP/AH header. SPI differentiates various ongoing conver⁃sations at the receiving party.
2.3 Internet Key Exchange The key exchange mechanismin IPsec is accomplishedthrough IKE version 2 protocol[7]. The key exchange processwith IKE finally leads to the con⁃struction of security association(SA) for IPsec. To establish anIPsec connection, IKE involvestwo phases. During these phasesa set of messages is communicat⁃ed, either in main mode or ag⁃gressive mode, resulting in theestablishment of a secure chan⁃nel between the peers. Phase 1enables peers to agree on the se⁃curity proposals generally as
AH: authentication headerESP: encapsulating security payload HDR: headerTCP: transfer control protocol UDP: user datagram protocol
▲Figure 2. IPsec packet encapsulations with AH and ESP in both tunnel and transport modes; fields in red
are encrypted and thus known only to end entities (i.e., not any third party in the middle of conversation in⁃
cluding OpenFlow switch or controller). It is also noteworthy that both protocols in different modes have their
SPI in plaintext within the ESP/AH header.
Original IP HDR AH HDR TCP/UDP HDR Data (1) Transport mode
New IP HDR AH HDR Original IP HDR TCP/UDP HDR (2) Tunnel modeData
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well as the shared secret key and authenticate each other. Up⁃on finalizing a secure tunnel in phase 1, phase 2 negotiates thecustom security parameters between peers. On completion ofphase 2, an SA is formed in a unidirectional manner. Each SA,as a logical connection, defines the way that the traversing traf⁃fic will be processed. Subsequently, the same security process⁃ing applies to the traffic associated with every SA.Because a single SA specifies only two parties in a unidirec⁃tional manner, each party holds a security association database (SADB) comprising multiple SAs, where each SA is asso⁃ciated with a different peer. SPI comprises an arbitrary 32⁃bitvalue utilized by a receiving party to differentiate the SA towhich an incoming IPsec packet is associated. For a unicastcommunication, SPI on its own can specify an SA. Other pa⁃rameters, such as the type of IPsec protocol can come alongwith SPI to highlight a unique SA. However, [8] emphasizesthat the sufficiency of SPI on its own to determine an individu⁃al SA to which inbound traffic will be mapped or necessity toexploit other parameters in conjunction with SPI is a local mat⁃ter. As we will see later, SPI can fall into a domain largeenough to uniquely identify an SA. The following tuple illus⁃trates the parameters any combination of which can be used toconstruct the primary key for SADB locally:{SPI, IPsec Protocol Type (AH/ESP), Peer IP Address,Transform Set, Secret Key, SA Lifetime}A combination of the elements in the vector above willshape SADB and determine various SAs stored on each peer.
2.4 GDOIGroup Encrypted Transport VPN solution[6], [9]- [10] withGDOI its heart is deemed to provide revolutionary and ultimatetechnology that reduces complexity and overheads pertainingto the need for scalable as well as secure transport remedy foralways ⁃ on and dynamic connectivity of extremely integratednetwork sites spread over diverged domains. Any⁃ to ⁃any net⁃work connectivity is guaranteed to be end ⁃ to ⁃ end encrypted,authenticated and globally scalable for all applications namelyvoice, video and data with both unicast as well as multicasttraffic. In other words, with the advent of GDOI architecture,the arduous obstacle of complexity pertaining to manageableas well as scalable VPN solutions for an abundance of fully ⁃meshed sites (not only two endpoints) is not out of the questionanymore[11].GDOI as a cryptographic protocol for key management isbased on IKE. While IKE ensures pairwise security associa⁃tions between various peers, GDOI utilizing IKE phase 1 be⁃tween each GMand a key server (KS) ends up with a single andcommon SA between all the GMs. Additional to pair⁃wise SAswith IKE phase 1, GDOI also“interprets”IKE to come upwith a single SA for the group security domain. In other words,as the foundation of the GET VPN solution, GDOI defines IKEDomain of Interpretation (DOI). Utilizing UDP port 848, GDOImessages create, delete, and maintain SAs established be⁃
tween authenticated and authorized GMs. KS rekeys the groupbefore current keys downloaded at the time of registration byGMs expire. As Fig. 3 reveals, regardless of what the core net⁃work’s technology is (WAN, MPLS, OpenFlow, etc.), each GMinitially exchanges a GDOI Register message with KS whichleads to downloading required keys and policies via bidirec⁃tional arrows. KS at some point in time before current keys ex⁃pire pushes Rekey message which entails new policies as wellas keys to given GMs via unidirectional arrows. In this way, en⁃crypted multicast/unicast conduits are established amongst allGMs, not merely two endpoints, to communicate without anytunneling in place.Tunnel⁃less but secure communication with GDOI for Trans⁃port VPN requires GMs to first dispatch registration queries toKS. With the aid of GDOI, KS authenticates and authorizes thegiven GM and sends back keying materials in addition to theIPsec policy needed for secure GM⁃to⁃GM(s) unicasting/ multi⁃casting back to the given GM.
3 Proposed Method and Discussion
3.1 Integration of IPsec within OpenFlow ArchitectureIncreased control gained through custom forwarding ofOpenFlow does enable different flows to be processed in differ⁃ent ways. OpenFlow is advantageous from this wide range ofdefinitions for flows of any combination of header field definedfor“OpenFlow spec v1.0 conforming switch”in section 2.A can highlight a flow. However, when it comes to end⁃ to⁃
ATM: asynchronous transfer modeGDOI: group domain of interpretationGM: group member
KS: key serverMPLS: multi⁃protocol label switchingWAN: wide area network
▲Figure 3. Upon downloading IPsec policies and keys from KS, GM is
now registered with the“IPsec SA for the group”and can exchange uni⁃
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end IPsec transmission, OpenFlow is unable to detect encrypt⁃ed IPsec headers, which is discussed in section 2.2, and thuscannot aggregate them into a flow. The only exception is whenOpenFlow filters the incoming packets to find a match for theIPsec protocol type, which is not sufficient to uniquely identifya flow because various but irrelevant entities might dissemi⁃nate IPsec traffic for each other. Encrypted packet headers inIPsec act as a deterrent so OpenFlow switch treats them as adistinct flow [12]. With the standard header fields of“Open⁃Flow spec v1.0 conforming switch”today, the IPsec ESP⁃en⁃crypted packets cannot be processed based on layer 4 andabove information in both transport and tunnel modes. Open⁃Flow architecture also cannot deal with decrypting layer⁃3 in⁃formation for IPsec with ESP in tunnel mode if any boundarypacket forwarder peels the new IP header off before processingfurther for original layer 3 discovery and then delivery (whenVPN tunnel terminates one hop before). To sum up, OpenFlowarchitecture is unable to aggregate flows of IPsec with ESP inboth transport and tunnel modes because layer⁃3 and above in⁃formation is encrypted and therefore unreadable for OpenFlowinterface. Our method tries to find the distinguishing factor foruniquely identifying IPsec flows and directing these flows ac⁃cordingly in order to replace the packet ⁃ based behavior ofOpenFlow architecture towards IPsec with flow ⁃based behav⁃ior. We argue that through our proposed method, in the Open⁃Flow environment we can overcome the abovementioned obsta⁃cles in the core network.
Fig. 4(a) shows the baseline scenario in which A tries to es⁃tablish a secure communication with B via IPsec. It is possiblethat A acts as a remote access server which serves many cli⁃ents or shares files with them via IPsec communication (can beKS in GDOI⁃like implementation). R2, R3, R4 and R5 form thecore network elements in which OpenFlow architecture is em⁃ployed. R1 and R6 can be thought of as security⁃aware gatewaysbetween which IPsec tunnel mode is constructed. In the trans⁃port mode of IPsec, they can be seen as local routers while endhosts address immune communication directly.The dashed arrows indicate the conduits for the OpenFlowcontroller to securely talk to OpenFlow switches across thecore network by OpenFlow protocol. Without our proposedmethod, IPsec packets from endpoint A to B in the figurereaching R2 cannot be treated as a flow and should be sent tothe OpenFlow controller one by one for decision ⁃ making ifthey are encrypted with ESP (unreadable layer 3 and above in⁃formation). This will degrade network performance and imposea huge processing burden on the OpenFlow controller withinthe core network. This is because each IPsec packet is treatedwith packet⁃based behavior by being encapsulated and sent tothe OpenFlow controller for decision⁃making one by one. Ourgoal is to aggregate IPsec packets associated with each securecommunication and forward them as flow satisfying arbitraryrouting policies of the core network for instance. This might bethe case if in an attempt to assign a specific physical route
which highly considers security countermeasures and thus ismore trustworthy for the IPsec communications (or other trafficengineering tasks such as seeking more available bandwidth),IPsec flows are separated from other flows and then forwardedthrough this route. Another use case as we will discuss is whenmore than two endpoints as group members participate in se⁃cure group communications over IPsec via GDOI.
Fig. 4(b) shows that R2 through our method will eventuallyseparate IPsec flow from other incoming traffic sent by R1,such as http, and direct it via capable and highly trustworthy R2⁃to⁃R3⁃to⁃R4 links to R6 as the egress point. In packet⁃based be⁃havior of OpenFlow architecture, encrypted packets must beencapsulated and then traverse the OpenFlow controller oneby one for further processing. Nevertheless, we aim to aggre⁃gate IPsec traffic at R2 and treat it as a flow without involvingthe OpenFlow controller’s resources for processing each pack⁃et individually. Specifically, while the problem was that whenpackets are encrypted using ESP, the flow identifiers are en⁃crypted and hence cannot be used to distinguish flows, we pro⁃pose using the SPI of IPsec within the OpenFlow architectureas the distinguishing factor for uniquely identifying IPsec flows
▲Figure 4. (a): Each IPsec packet is treated with packet⁃based behavior
by being encapsulated and sent to the OpenFlow controller for further
decision making one by one. (b): Flow⁃based behaviour through our pro⁃
posed method, aggregation of given IPsec traffic along with its separa⁃
tion from other IPsec traffic in the core network have been accom⁃
plished.
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and directing these flows accordingly.The functionality of our design is irrespective of IPsecmodes or protocols. This makes the remedy flexible enough tocope with all four different encapsulations (Fig. 2). However,because the security database (SDB) construction on the Open⁃Flow controller is slightly different in transport mode than intunnel mode, we bring two scenarios here for different modes.The design needs to consider the fact that network elements inthe core network are simple packet⁃forwarders that are security⁃unaware (backward compatible to“OpenFlow spec v1.0 con⁃forming switches”). In other words, we cannot expect any cryp⁃tographic processing on these OpenFlow switches. They are on⁃ly capable of finding a simple match for each incoming packetagainst their flow⁃table and taking a particular action, like for⁃warding, and subsequent packets of the same match according⁃ly to treat them as a flow.However, this flexibility acquired through the simplicity ofOpenFlow architecture cannot distinguish“between”IPsecflows, which is now needed to adapt to secure group communi⁃cation in GDOI ⁃ like architecture for instance. This is due tothe fact that the distinguishing factor (if residing in layer⁃3 orabove) is encrypted in the ESP protocol. Each incoming packetencrypted by IPsec with ESP needs to be forwarded to theOpenFlow controller if any information above the IP layer is re⁃quired for flow⁃table match⁃finding.
3.2 Considerations for ESP in Transport ModeIn section 2.3, the first set of messaging between end⁃devic⁃es forms the secure channel over which the transmitters com⁃municate. Once the agreement by end ⁃ devices has beenreached (IKE phase 2 finished), SAs are established separatelyfor each direction by A as well as B and stored locally in theirSADBs. Here, we consider IKE negotiations between end⁃points irrespective of the proposed method because SAs needto be constructed prior to treating secure IPsec communicationas a flow. Once SAs are established via IKE, the first IP data⁃gram containing the actual secure data onwards can be han⁃dled with the proposed design as a flow. Finding a match forheader fields listed in Fig. 1b for IPsec on an OpenFlow switchand forwarding based on that fails because end⁃to⁃end securecommunication ensures that the transmission is unreadable toany entity in the middle when it is ESP for layer⁃3 and above[12]. On the other hand, these fields are considered as assetsaccessible only to end⁃entities who might be reluctant to sharethem with third parties. The OpenFlow controller initially de⁃termines each flow with the aid of the first packet of the com⁃munication. This is reasonable because in the beginning, theflow⁃table has no entry of the flow information before launch⁃ing the communication. Nevertheless, for IPsec flows, the rele⁃vant information is an asset (secret) and thus only both endshave access to it. Because SAs are formed in each direction,each end device is responsible for sharing the required infor⁃mation (here SPI) with the OpenFlow controller prior to travers⁃
ing the actual flows. Another approach is to let the controller it⁃self infer the SPI because the controller can intercept all IPsecsession setup traffic and learn the SPI used between hosts.The SPI acts like a cookie for IPsec where for A⁃to⁃B securecommunication (two ends, not a group), B firstly determinesthe SPI value for A⁃to⁃B SA and announces it via IKE to A whothen carries it in its header field (either AH or ESP header) ofIPsec packet(s) to B in plaintext. Consequently, in theory, ei⁃ther A as the data originator should share the received SPIspecified by B to the OpenFlow controller or the controller it⁃self infers it directly by intercepting IKE messages.Upon establishing each SA, the end ⁃ device populates itsSADB table locally with the relevant security related informa⁃tion. So far, only A and B in Fig. 4 are aware of the securitycredentials pertaining to IPsec communication between one an⁃other. Each SA in each direction can be associated with an SPInumber. Subsequently, 232 different SAs can theoretically beestablished and differentiated between two end⁃hosts on eachsite. The SPI is the same for different sequence numbers ofthe same IPsec communication in a unidirectional manner, andthis makes it an appropriate candidate as well as a distinguish⁃ing factor among various flow header fields in the design (withmore than two entities, SPI also remains the same within agroup domain in GDOI). To sanitize it more, bear in mind thatIPsec is an immune communication from one sender to anotherreceiver in a one⁃way direction in which the relevant SA is as⁃sociated with an SPI carried within AH/ESP headers in plain⁃text. As a result, for the receiving party, this SPI determinesthe corresponding SA and thus how the IPsec packet (and re⁃sultant flow) will be processed based on the security policy al⁃ready agreed on mutually via IKE.Back to Fig. 5(a), we suggest that B shares the SPI with theOpenFlow controller either through in⁃band (if controller inter⁃cepts IKE messages and infers SPI base on them) or out ⁃ of ⁃band channels for secure transmission A⁃to⁃B before dissemi⁃nating the actual data. A might have big data and be willing totransmit it in a secure manner to B for instance. The dashedblue arrow reveals the process of handing out the SPI to theOpenFlow controller. Our method requires a SDB on the Open⁃Flow controller. This SDB contains security related informa⁃tion for IPsec communications. The amount of security creden⁃tials shared with the OpenFlow controller is in the end⁃host’shands. However, our design emphasizes that for flow⁃based be⁃haviour towards IPsec within OpenFlow architecture, SDBshould be populated with SPI at least. In IPsec transport mode,original layer 3 information is also added. Upon sharing SPIwith OpenFlow controller by B, the OpenFlow controller mustperform an existence check against SDB looking for the an⁃nounced SPI. If duplicated SPI coexists, the OpenFlow control⁃ler should use original layer 3 information as complementary toSPI to uniquely identify the IPsec conversation and update thepacket forwarders on the way accordingly. Next, we introduceour new flow header fields for OpenFlow interfaces on the
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switches which contain the new field“SPI”in tuple below inaddition to that already mentioned Fig. 1b: {Forwarding Port,VLAN ID, Source MAC, Destination MAC, Ethernet Type,Source IP, Destination IP, IP Protocol, Source TCP, Destina⁃tion TCP, SPI}The SPI in plaintext is carried within AH/ESP headers.Therefore, OpenFlow switches are able to detect it directly.The addition of the SPI header field is backward compatiblewith OpenFlow spec v1.0 conforming switches and does notdeem that network elements have any cryptographic capabili⁃ties and thus is scalable at the minimum cost.In a similar way to Fig. 5(a), with Fig. 5(b), A, B and C forma group for secure communication in multicast from A to bothB and C with the same method in a GDOI ⁃ like manner. Thegroup is associated with SPI = 123 and OpenFlow forwardersare updated accordingly. R2 now forwards the incoming pack⁃ets with SPI = 123 to both R3 and R5 to form the IPsec flow forthe group under the common SA.
3.3 Considerations for ESP in Tunnel ModeThe main difference is that in tunnel mode the original layer3 information is itself encrypted. Consequently, the OpenFlowcontroller stores new IP source and destination information in
addition to SPI within its SDB at the minimum. This informa⁃tion is needed in case the same SPI has been already installedwithin SDB and thus more information is required to uniquelyidentify an IPsec flow. In our scenario, the OpenFlow control⁃ler now makes the decision to forward IPsec flows fulfilling itslocal routing policy and goals by updating appropriate switches
’flow⁃tables while the end to end security is still guaranteed.However, in addition to other header fields, SPI will now alsobe included for determination of IPsec flows.To sum up, as the flow header fields defined for OpenFlowspec v1.0 conforming switches indicate in Fig. 1(b), some origi⁃nal flow identification information such as TCP/UDP headersbecome unavailable with IPsec ESP encrypted traffic for in ⁃path OpenFlow switches to identify/distinguish. With the aid ofSPI, which is unencrypted but authenticated in ESP TunnelMode, for example, we propose that in⁃path OpenFlow switch⁃es should not only read SPI but can also differentiate IPsecflows accordingly. Using SPI information for classification re⁃quires the architecture to embed a mechanism to notify the con⁃troller of updates on the SPI values through either in⁃band orout⁃of⁃band mechanisms, such as interpreting IKE negotiations(this can be done prior to actual end⁃to⁃end secure communica⁃tion or through interpreting the first packets of a given IPsec
SPI: security parameter index NOX: network operating system SDB: security database
▲Figure 5.(a) End⁃entity B shares its SPI with the controller through in⁃band/out⁃of⁃band mechanisms to add the ability to‘distinguish between’IPsec
flows. (b) A, B & C form a group for secure communication in a multicast⁃like manner, from A to both B and C for instance, based on GDOI.
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B through in-band/out-of-band mechanisms shares its SPI=123,Source and Destination IPs with the Controller. Another approach isthat Controller can infer SPI by intercepting IKE message signalling.
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flow by the controller). No matter which, the controller usingthis mechanism needs to update in⁃path OpenFlow switches ofthe given SPI so that it can be read and interpreted for thebroad range of intended flow definitions, presuming that ournew flow header fields are in place for OpenFlow interfaces onthe switches which contain the new field called“SPI”(in addi⁃tion to the ones defined for OpenFlow spec v1.0 conformingswitches displayed in Fig. 1(b)).Besides the merits achieved by integrating IPsec flows intoOpenFlow architecture such as secure group communicationsbased on GDOI standard as discussed in section 4, classifying/policing/shaping IPsec flows let us meet different end⁃ to ⁃endQoS goals in networks as [12] also points out. For instance, us⁃age of SPI within our proposal here enables the OpenFlowswitch to perform class⁃based queuing (CBQ) whereby crypto⁃graphically protected traffic among different applications, us⁃ers (or groups), user affiliations and so forth can be distin⁃guished with an improved level of granularity. Remember thatCBQ also accomplishes priority queuing where the preferencewith which the flows are serviced (can be reliant on service lev⁃el agreements (SLAs) between different domains for instance)as well as the amount of the queued traffic for them are deter⁃mined.
4 Use Case: Secure Group Communication
Based on GDOITraditionally, point⁃to⁃point tunnels between VPN gateways
were used to carry authenticated and encrypted traffic fromone site to another (two ends). For secure group communica⁃tion with GDOI, encryption/authentication is separated fromtransport. The merit of this is that secure communication be⁃tween various sites (more than two) is possible without any tun⁃nels between these branches. This does open the door also forthe OpenFlow architecture in the core network eliminating anyneed for crypto functionality to address transport requirements.In Fig. 6 (left), we tried to emulate through Cisco infrastruc⁃ture [13] GDOI between three nodes, namely, R2, R3 and R4(can be thought of as A, B and C in Fig. 5(b)) as the GMs. R2,R3 and R4 with assigned IP 10.0.0.1/24, 10.0.0.2/24 and10.0.0.3/24 (all on one subnet), respectively, form a group look⁃ing for secure communications through GDOI. R1 will play therole of KS in there. It is likely that the OpenFlow controllerserves as the KS. SW1 will represent the core network, whichis OpenFlow equipped with our method to respect distinct IP⁃sec flows. GDOI can operate over all the core technologiesand therefore must remain infrastructure⁃independent. The ob⁃jective here is to eavesdrop on the SW1 after proper GDOI im⁃plementation between R2, R3 and R4 via Wireshark to infer theSPI associated with this group domain. Wireshark Flow Graph(Fig. 6). captures all the encrypted communications on the sub⁃net within the group (10.0.0.0/24) after GDOI implementationshowing that all the group members share the same SPI for IP⁃sec ESP for the group domain communications. SW1 is re⁃quired to respect our method through the ability to“distin⁃guish between”IPsec flows using SPI in order to integrate the
ESP: encapsulating security payload SPI: security parameter index
▲Figure 6. Left：baseline scenario in GNS3; R2, R3 and R4 are willing to form a group based on GDOI. Right: Wireshark Flow Graph highlights the
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.1/24
notion of secure group communication within SDN. DespiteAH, in IPsec with ESP, encryption makes payload and the ulti⁃mate transmitters’identifications meaningless to the eaves⁃droppers. This highlights the main use case for our methodwithin OpenFlow. R2, R3 and R4 were already coded for multi⁃cast OSPF as well as PIM to generate some multicast traffic be⁃fore and after GDOI implementation to highlight the role ofthis IPsec ⁃based group control protocol. As Fig. 6 (right) re⁃veals, upon finishing GDOI implementation, all the communi⁃cations originating from GMs (R2, R3 and R4) destined for anymulticast address including 224.0.0.5 (for multicast OSPF) or224.0.0.13 (for PIM multicast) are secured with IPsec ESPwhile all the communication within this group domain is shar⁃ing the same SPI.
5 Conclusion and Future WorkIn this paper, we have addressed the deficiency for inter⁃working of OpenFlow with IPsec in both IPsec tunnel as wellas transport modes. OpenFlow architecture cannot aggregateflows of IPsec with ESP because layer⁃3 and above informationis encrypted and therefore unreadable. In this paper, we haveproposed using the SPI of IPsec within the OpenFlow architec⁃ture in order to uniquely identify IPsec flows and direct theseflows accordingly. This replaces packet ⁃ based behavior ofOpenFlow architecture towards IPsec with a flow⁃based behav⁃ior and removes the obstacle of encrypted flow identifiers. Wealso proposed new flow header fields for OpenFlow switches/in⁃terfaces which contain SPI for switching IPsec flows. SharingSPI with the OpenFlow controller will not jeopardize the immu⁃nity of end⁃to⁃end IPsec conversation because they are alreadyin plaintext. The proposed method facilitates the ability to dis⁃tinguish between IPsec flows in order to integrate secure groupcommunication into the OpenFlow architecture. The main usecase where identifying“between”IPsec flows can be useful iswhen secure group communication is required in a similar wayto GDOI architecture as discussed.We will carry out further works on simulating the proposedmethod in order to evaluate its scalability as well as the perfor⁃mance in the next step based on [14].
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